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12. PROGRESS THROUGH PRECEDENT: GOING WHERE NO
HELICOPTER SIMULATOR HAS GONE BEFORE
RICHARD J. ADAMS
Since it is late in the day I would like to tell you a
brief story about helicopter safety which was mentioned
this morning by Dick Birnbach and a few others, how we
have gotten to where we are.
I would like to discuss the last 5 years of training and
how we have improved and how we have reduced acci-
dents by doing cognitive training. And finally, I would
like to suggest appropriate thoughts for our discussions
tomorrow.
The following is a quote from Dwight Eisenhower.
Like all political quotes, it can be taken in many ways.
"Things are more like they are now than they ever have
been before." It made me think that we haven't come very
far since the workshop in 1985. But you can also look at it
as an opportunity to accomplish some things in this work-
shop. I hope by the end of the presentation you will
understand in what way I have contributed to it.
Let's talk about safety and the general definition of
safety. There are a lot of parameters that helicopter people
use (accident/100,000 departures, risk of serious injury,
etc.). There are a lot of parameters that fixed-wing people
use (accidents/100,000 hours, accidents/100,000 passen-
ger miles, etc.). I am limited by time to reviewing only
one set of data, and I have accepted the following defini-
tion; I hope you will, too. "Safety is the identification and
control of risk according to some preconceived
parameters."
Historically, the FAA and NTSB supply data for
accidents per 100,000 hours. The data set shown in fig-
ure 1 came from Jim McDaniel's office when we looked
at safety parameters. Accidents per 100,000 departures,
accidents within a mile of a heliport, and years between
accidents in terms of a facility. As you can see, there is a
quarter century of data shown in figure 1. It tells a very
interesting story. At least in the United States you notice
in 1965 we were running 55 or 60 accidents per
100,000 hours (total fatal and nonfatal).
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Figure 1. Safety needs.
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Andthenoveraperiodofabout10years,1965to
1975,wedroppedbyalmosttwo-thirdsdownto20.Those
ofyouinthiscountrywhohavebeenintheindustrythat
longrealizethatthatwasthetimetheturbinenginewas
introduced.About1965wewerealmost100%pistons.
Thentheturbinewasintroduced,withitshighermechani-
calreliability,easiermaintenance,andvariousafety
improvements.I don'twantoimplythattheturbinewas
theonlychange,butit wasoneofthemajorchangesthat
occurreduringthe1965-1975period.
Duringthemiddleofthetimeperiodcoveredin
figureI (about1975),wehadabunchofveryexperienced
militarypilotsreturningfromVietnam.Thosepilotswere
militaryandhumanandtheyhadgoodandbadhabits;
however,theydidhaveahighdegreeofexperiencein risk
management,whichhasbeenmentionedbyseveralpeo-
pletoday.Theywereabletoworkunderhigh-workload,
stressfulconditions.Later,I willpointoutsomeareas
wheresimulatorsmaybeusedtoprovidemorerealistic
risk-managementtraining.
Then,about1975to 1980,inthiscountrywebegan
torealizethatalloftheseaccidents,atleastalargeper-
centageofthem 65%in theentirehelicoptercommu-
nity,if youlookedatthemorehigh-riskEMSit isnearer
80% wereallhuman-errorelated.Thesamethingwas
occurringinfixedwing;about80%offixed-wingacci-
dentswerealsoattributedtopiloten'°r"The bottom line
was to start stressing the human elements in studies. As a
result, NASA developed a substantial effort in the area of
cockpit resources management. And we were successful
in bringing the accident rate down somewhat, although it
is leveling off as you can see. I think that is the challenge
we face here. Getting back to the study that generated the
curve shown in figure 1, we set a goal of trying to get the
rate down to 4.5 accidents per 100,000 hours by 1995.
I would like to talk about a successful human-error
reduction program and about conventional training and
some ways we may begin to depart. Figure 2 depicts the
basic novice pilot, or ab initio, coming in with a lot of
knowledge. He knows systems, he knows aerodynamics,
he knows the ATC system, he knows weather, he knows
procedures on top of that, stall practice, autorotation,
things like that. He builds skills in flying the aircraft.
Until recently, 1985-1986, it was always thought he could
only learngoodjudgement or decision-making through
experience. We all know that led to a lot of bending of
metal and unfortunate injuries and accidents.
So the FAA set out, between 1975 and 1985, on a
program to seeifwe could ii-_in-and actually teach better
decision-making in the classroom. It has turned out to be
very successful, as Pete Hwoschinsky mentioned this
morning. We generated 15 different manuals, everything
from students' private manuals up to manuals for adminis-
trators and Part 135 operators. These have been used
throughout the industry and the military.
As an example, Petroleum Helicopter, Inc. (PHI)
looked at their accident data from 1982 through 1986.
Correct me if I am wrong, Jerry [Golden], but you fly
about 2 million takeoffs and landings annually. Before
1986 PHI could not get the accident rate below two per
100,000 hours. And in 1987 they dropped it to 1.86 per
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100,000 hours. The following years, after all the pilots
were trained, they dropped it to 1.046.
The Navy did a similar thing and reduced the human-
error factors in helicopter accidents by 51%. Bell has
introduced advanced decision-making into their world-
wide 206 safety seminars. They believe that even though
they haven't reached all their operators, they have
achieved a reduction of 31% in human-error accidents.
The bottom line is we can train decision-making, but
there is a problem. The problem is that when we look
closely at the procedures and the attitudinal training we
developed, they work much better with the ab initio and
less experienced (5-year-and-under) pilot.
The research I am working on now is aimed at how
we get at the more experienced pilot, how does he think
differently? At the same time, we were getting all the
good results in the helicopter community. The air carriers
were having some spectacular saves or, as Dick Birnbach
said, some diabolical failures: failures of aircraft materi-
als, the Sioux City accident, a lost engine, a lost hydraulic
system. The two decompressions, Flight 811 United
Honolulu, and the Flight 232 Maui accident Aloha--both
aircraft incurred very large holes in the fuselages.
In the case of 232, I will just dwell on two of the suc-
cesses for a minute. The captain had access to a training
airman in the back who know how to control pitch and
yaw with the throttles. The captain immediately accepted
his volunteer and used him to control lateral movement
and aircraft pitch attitude. While they were doing that and
checking to make sure that passengers were prepared for
an emergency, they were still fighting a tendency for a
38° right bank and severe pitch oscillations, or phugoids.
Nevertheless, as you know, they successfully brought the
aircraft down, at least in a partial save.
Both of these decompression accidents (UAL
Honolulu and Aloha, Maui) are very interesting because
the pilots and crew acted contrary to handbook training
procedure, which would have had them dive to regain
cabin pressure. The captain decided that would be a bad
move, because it might enlarge the hole in the fuselage.
As a result, he decided to slow the aircraft. However, he
didn't know the speed at which the aircraft would stall,
given the big hole in the fuselage and the extra drag it
created.
The second important thing about all of the saves--
all the time they were handling the emergencies while
creating new procedures, if you will, in response to the
cues they had. They were able to keep up the housekeep-
ing chores, they communicated with ATC, they did engine
shutdown checklists, all the things they were trained to
do. That is a lesson we will get back to in a minute.
During the past 30 months I have been looking at the
accidents, looking at the difference between experts and
ab initios, and it turns out there are 24 different character-
istics that distinguish experts from novices. I have sum-
marized the top five in table 1. Believe it or not, in an
emergency pilots go back to what their instructors told
them--they fly the airplane. That is evidenced in all the
accidents studied, they have instantaneous recall of train-
ing; in some cases it takes on the characteristics of
instinct. They maintain their composure, they come up
with a reasonable plan, and they execute it with all their
available resources. It is not surprising that this is exactly
what we have been trying to train for with the cockpit
resources management program. Finally, as we know,
pilots are goal-oriented, self-assured individuals.
Table 1. Training needs: expert characteristics
1. Reversion to basic airmanship skills
2. Instantaneous recall of training
3. Reasoned approach in emergencies
4. Positive in approach and expectations
5. Self-assured and optimistic
I would like to look now at a few of what we call
fatal fallacies (table 2). They are attributed to Dr. Walt
Schneider at the University of Pittsburgh. He looked at
both air-traffic control and aviation accidents and came up
with these six fallacies. I don't know why he termed them
fatal, but undoubtedly he has his reasons.
Basically, practice makes perfect is a fallacy because
it is a bump and grind approach. It does work, but it does
not have a lasting effect on most people. In some cases the
procedure is never learned properly. Training a task in
Table 2. Training needs: fatal fallacies a
1. Practice makes perfect
2. Train in the form to be used
3. Skill training is intrinsically motivating
4. Must include high accuracy standards
5. Initial performance predicts eventual outcome
6. Intellectual understanding produces proficiency
aDr. Walter Schneider, University of Pittsburgh
Learning and Development Center.
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exactlytheforminwhichit istobeusedistime-ineffi-
cient.Wetalkedaboutautorotationearlier,slingloads,
thingslikethat.Inthefixed-wing,wehavingholding
patterns.All thosethingscanbelearnedmuchbetterand
retainedbetterwithquickreenforcementpracticing,i0 or
20anhourasopposedto 1or2anhour.Theyarethings
thatcanbestbedoneinasimulator.
Number3--skilltrainingisintrinsicallymotivating--
isinterestingbecauseflyingisfunin itselfandpeopleare
motivatedtolearnhow.Buteventhoughthatmightbe
trueinitially,afteryouhavebeenatit for5yearsit seems
thathebasicthrillisusuallygoneandyouaregoing
throughthehoops,goingthroughtheFAA-required
checklistofmaneuvers.Butagain,whatheyfound at
Pittsburgh was that if they had bells and interesting
sounds and visual cues for training reenforcement, they
had a 30% to 50% reduction in failure rate.
The fourth one--high accuracy standards--is particu-
larly pertinent. That is, we all think about high accuracy
standards--good steady needles, good heading and alti-
tude control; these are very important, especially in the
real world. But they are not necessarily the best way to
train in a simulator. What happens when you become a
very accurate, precise pilot? You may not be very good at
other things, like high-workload tasks, emergencies,
multiple-tasking, sharing your attention. These are best
taught in a loft scenario, in a simulator, in composite high
stressful situations, as Dave Green said in his presentation
earlier today.
The last two of the fallacies are self-expanatory.
Early this morning I heard some words from the FAA
that got me very excited. The regulations are being
changed to allow the inc_lusion of more simulators. What
is appropriate training? What can we do? What should we
do in simulator versus, aircraft? I submit that the current
standards for Simulator uses (table 3), though limited,
= _: ::
should be retained and should not be thrown out with the
bath water, as someone said. Greg McGowan pointed out
that he trained nearly i0,_0 pilots with these; the evi-
dence I pointed out earlier documents that it works, as
well. My perception was that at least part of the reasons
for the four required aircraft maneuvers was that the FAA
needs to maintain control. I again need to suggest that we
have to discover whether the hover and the current four
maneuvers are the correct ones to retain,
Ed Boothe suggested an exemptlon if somebody
wants to come up with that. I think in this group, with the
expertise we have, we can come up with a better set of
criteria.
As far as interim uses are concerned (table 3), I have
been thoroughly brainwashed by Curt Treichel and others
in this room to think that if a pilot has the experience,
i12
Table 3. Appropriate training
1. _Cu_ent simulator Uses ......................
Biannual flight review 61.56
D/N currency, instrument competency 61.57c,d,e(2)
12/24 month PiC check 61.58b,c
ATP rot0rcraft type check (90%) 61.163a
Inltialtrecurrency testing 135.293
PiC instrument proficiency 135.297
2. Quality control
Hover requirement versus hover proficiency
Emergency procedures (discussion vs experience)
3. Desired n6at-te#m Uses
FAR appl-0va] Versus exemption
_i5 roto_rafi add-on type rating 61.163a
Commercial add-on instrument 61.65g
ATP airplane add'on rotorcraft category 61.165
Instrument instructor 61.191
4. Alleviate training fallacies •
5. Support overall training and licensin_ system ......
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commercial rating, ATP fixed wing, there is no reason he
can't get the helicopter ATP add-on in the simulator.
And at the top of that list, I think we all would like to
see FAR approval of simulators as opposed to the timely,
costly exemption process. I think again, that together we
can come up with scenarios and lists of tasks that can
alleviate training fallacies. I am not talking about turning
things upside down that we have today, but about just
looking at the real world.
Finally we need to come up with an integrated
approach. I haven't heard anybody come up with a sys-
tems approach from the top down to designing a training
program. Far-term or blue sky, more controversial might
be total licensing and testing in the simulator (table 4).
We would like recognition of helicopter simulators equal
to that granted the fixed-wing simulators. There is no rea-
son that if a 727 pilot can get his type rating in a simulator
that we can't get type ratings in an S-76 simulator some
day. I don't know how many of you have looked at the
ATP program, which allows trading off simulator time.
We ought to set our sights on the rotorcraft community
the next time we are talking about that for helicopter
simulators.
Table 4. New frontiers: far-term suggestions
1. Initial licensing and testing
2. Equal recognition with airplane standards
3. Advanced qualification program
4. Crew testing and licensing
Finally, there is crew testing. I went over fixed-wing
accidents and how the interpersonal skills of the crews
were involved. You can't test that in an S-76 or in any
helicopter today. There is no place for the examiner to sit
back and evaluate the crew. It can only be done in a simu-
lator. Right now Curt Treichel tells me that crew evalua-
tions are limited because the test pilot sits in the left seat.
They think pilot in command (PIC), so we need to
work on that a little bit. Getting back to our expertise and
my current efforts. I think there is also an opportunity to
introduce some new concepts there. When we talk about
the next generation of decision-making training, the ques-
tion is when to do it.
The ab initio pilot knows all the facts; he has the facts
he needs to know to fly the airplane and to survive
(fig. 3). The low-time pilot knows how to survive, he has
instantaneous recall of what to do if the engine quits. But
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113
PROGRESS THROUGH PRECEDENT
he does not know when to alter those actions; he does not
have the ability to react to novel things. Like the pilot in
the cabin of Aloha 737, who looked back and saw blue
sky. I don't think we can take a true ab initio pilot and
bring him to that level; it is all in the procedural knowl-
edge base and how we use the procedures we have learned
in combination with the knowledge we have and facts that
we have learned.
And finally, the expert pilot does all this in a self-
regulatory mode. Self-regulatory means the next step in
situational awareness. As I said, the expert can undergo
an untrained-for emergency like those discussed and still
maintain his housekeeping chores, carrying out his normal
ATC communications and things like that. So they are not
impossible tasks; it is just going to require some new
training scenarios.
Finally, the most exciting new frontier I can think of
is our being here at this workshop and that we have been
invited to help the FAA generate new standards:
1. Joint industry-government simulator qualifica-
tion standards development
2. Appropriate and sufficient training and testing
criteria
3. Mission- and task/-driven qualification standards
I think it is a great opportunity and I think from talking to
the FAA people here, that it is going to be more pervasive
than just in the simulator area. I welcome the chance to
work with them. I think we should all think about the
words "appropriate and sufficient training." I think we
have a lot of components, we all know some of the
weakness. I think I have an idea of some of the new ones
based on research I have done. We need to think about
missions and tasks to use for training concepts.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to work-
ing with you in the next couple of days.
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